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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
                      
 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 I. 
  Santo Idone ("Idone") was a "capo" or "captain" in 
the Mafia family, headed by the infamous Nicodemo Scarfo.  On 
January 26, 1990, Idone was convicted of racketeering conspiracy 
(involving murder, extortion, loansharking and illegal gambling), 
racketeering, extortion and operating an illegal gambling 
business.  Idone was sentenced on April 6, 1990, to twenty years 
imprisonment and began serving his prison sentence on or about 
April 20, 1990. 
  On February 17, 1992, Idone filed a motion for 
reduction of his sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 35(b).1  On March 8, 1994, the district court granted 
Idone's motion and reduced his sentence to five and one half 
                     
 
   1  Because Idone was convicted for conduct that occurred 
before November 1, 1987, we must look at Rule 35(b) as it was 
prior to its most recent amendments. 
  
years imprisonment.  The United States of America ("the 
Government") petitioned for rehearing, and a hearing was held on 
March 10, 1994.  On April 5, 1994, the district court vacated its 
March 8, 1991, order because it found that it did not have 
jurisdiction over Idone's 35(b) motion.  In so holding, the court 
reasoned that the passage of twenty-five months from the filing 
of the motion to the entry of the court's March 8, 1991, order 
was not a "reasonable time" under Rule 35(b) within which to act 
on Idone's motion. 
  For the reasons stated herein, we agree with the 
district court's finding that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on 
Idone's motion for a reduction of his sentence. 
 II. 
  On January 26, 1990, Idone was convicted of:  
racketeering conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) 
(Count One); racketeering in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) 
(Count Two); extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Count 
Three); and operating an illegal gambling business, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (Count Four).  Idone was sentenced on April 
6, 1990, to a total of twenty years imprisonment and a $30,000 
fine.  Idone began serving his prison sentence on or about April 
20, 1990.   
  Idone's co-defendants, Mario Eufrasio and Gary 
Iacona, were convicted of similar offenses and sentenced to ten 
years and six years of imprisonment respectively.  During the 
  
three year period following imposition of sentence, the district 
judge reduced the sentences of these co-defendants pursuant to 
Rule 35(b) motions. 
  
  On May 15, 1991, this Court affirmed Idone's 
convictions on direct appeal, and on October 21, 1991, the United 
States Supreme Court denied Idone's petition for writ of 
certiorari.  See United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 340 (1991).  119 days after the 
Supreme Court denied his petition--only one day before the 
expiration of the 120-day filing deadline--Idone filed a motion 
for reduction of his sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 35(b).  Idone's motion requested a reduction 
in his sentence because of his failing health and the hardship to 
his family caused by his wife's failing health.  In that motion, 
Idone also alleged that under existing United States Parole 
Commission Guidelines he would be likely to serve approximately 
thirteen years and four months of his twenty year sentence.  
Idone, however, had waived parole consideration shortly after 
entering prison, so his thirteen year estimate was never 
substantiated.   
  On February 21, 1992, three days after the filing 
of his reduction motion, Idone made his first attempt to subpoena 
his medical records from the Federal Correctional Institution at 
Jesup, Georgia, where he was incarcerated.  The Bureau of Prisons 
did not produce Idone's medical records.  Defense counsel finally 
sought assistance from Government counsel and obtained the 
requested records on June 24, 1992.  Two months later, on August 
  
21, 1992, defendant forwarded the records along with some 
additional materials to the court.   
  In the meantime, Idone developed prostate cancer 
and was transferred from Jesup to Springfield, Missouri, for 
medical treatment.  On March 25, 1993, defense counsel subpoenaed 
Idone's medical records from Springfield and additional records 
from Jesup.  Defense counsel received the requested records on 
April 2, 1993, and, after a further delay, forwarded them to the 
Government attorney on June 2, 1993, and to the court, along with 
other materials, on July 2, 1993.  The Government responded to 
Idone's motion on September 23, 1993.  On February 14, 1994, 
defense counsel submitted a letter to the court requesting a 
decision on Idone's motion.   
  On March 8, 1994, approximately twenty-five months 
after Idone filed his Rule 35(b) motion, the district judge 
granted the motion and reduced Idone's sentence from twenty years 
to five and one half years.  As a result of that order, Idone 
became eligible for immediate release from prison.   
  The following day, the Government filed a motion 
for reconsideration of the district court's order, arguing for 
the first time that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
decide Idone's motion.  On March 10, 1994, the district court 
held a hearing on the Government's motion for reconsideration.  
At that hearing, the district judge commented that he had waited 
a significant amount of time before granting motions for 
  
reduction of sentence for Idone's co-defendants Eufrasio and 
Iacona: 
  
 "because I wanted to see to it that they put 
in the length of time that I intended when I 
entered the sentences.  Because at the time I 
didn't know what the Parole Board -- what 
release date would be set by the Parole 
Board.  And I had always anticipated doing 
something on their behalf, and I sat and 
waited on those for a long time, too.  And in 
this one [Idone's motion], I intended to do a 
similar act even on that basis, and didn't 
see the need to hurry, and didn't know there 
was a time limit." 
Appendix ("App.") 371.2 
  Following the hearing, the court entered a stay of 
its prior order and directed the parties to submit briefs on the 
issue.  On April 5, 1994, the district court vacated its prior 
order because it found that it did not have jurisdiction over 
Idone's Rule 35(b) motion.  The court, citing United States v. 
Diggs, 740 F.2d 239, 245-46 (3d Cir. 1984), reasoned that the 
passage of twenty-five months from the filing of the motion to 
the entry of the court's reduction order was not a "reasonable 
time" under Rule 35(b), regardless of the reasons for that delay.  
Thus, Idone's original sentence was reinstated.  Idone filed a 
timely appeal of the district court's decision.   We have 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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  In the April 5, 1994, order, the court noted that the 
reduction in Idone's sentence was "consistent with and 
proportionate to reductions of sentence previously granted two of 
defendant's co-defendants in this case, and also consistent with 
the Court's judgment regarding the appropriate length of 
defendant's sentence, in light of defendant's actual involvement 
in the criminal activity which formed the basis of his 
conviction."  App. 394.   
  
  We review the grant or denial of a motion for a 
reduction of sentence under Rule 35 for an abuse of discretion.  
See, e.g., Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 603 F.2d 
438, 443 (3d Cir. 1979).  In this case, however, the district 
court held that it lacked jurisdiction to decide Idone's motion 
for a reduction of sentence because it concluded, as a matter of 
law, that a delay of twenty-five months between the filing of the 
motion and the court's decision could not constitute a 
"reasonable time" under Rule 35(b), regardless of the reasons for 
the delay.  We must review this legal conclusion under the 
plenary standard of review.  See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson-Merck 
Consumer Pharmaceuticals Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 III. 
  The issue before us is whether the district court 
properly determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Idone's 
motion for reduction of sentence pursuant to Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 35(b).  Rule 35(b), as applicable to 
offenses committed prior to November 1, 1987, provides: 
 A motion to reduce a sentence may be made . . 
. within 120 days after the sentence is 
imposed or probation is revoked, or within 
120 days after receipt by the court of a 
mandate issued upon affirmance of the 
judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or 
within 120 days after entry of any order or 
judgment of the Supreme Court denying review 
of, or having the effect of upholding a 
judgment of conviction or probation 
  
revocation.  The court shall determine the 
motion within a reasonable time. . . .3 
The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules defined a "reasonable 
time" as as long as a district court judge reasonably needs to 
consider and act upon the motion.  It also explained that the 
reasonableness of the time taken by the district court to act on 
such motions must be appraised in light of the reasons for the 
delay and the policies supporting the time limitations.  See also 
United States v. Parrish, 796 F.2d 920, 923 (7th Cir. 1986).  The 
two purposes of the policies supporting the time limitations are:  
protecting "the district court from continuing and successive 
importunities;" and assuring "that the district court's power to 
reduce a sentence will not be misused as a substitute for the 
consideration of the Parole Board."  United States v. Taylor, 768 
F.2d 114, 118 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting United States v. 
Stollings, 516 F.2d 1287, 1289 (4th Cir. 1975)). 
  In United States v. Diggs, 740 F.2d 239 (3d Cir. 
1984), we were faced with an issue similar to the one raised in 
the present case.  Diggs filed a motion for reduction of sentence 
pursuant to Rule 35(b) on December 26, 1979.  Diggs' motion was 
not served on the Government or docketed until July 22, 1982, 
approximately two and one half years after it was filed.  On the 
day it was docketed, the district court granted Diggs' motion, 
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  Although Rule 35(b) was amended in 1987 as part of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, that amendment does not apply to 
the present case because Idone's offenses were committed prior to 
November 1, 1987.   
  
without notice to the government or a hearing, reducing his ten 
year sentence to three and one half years and making him eligible 
for immediate release.  The government immediately moved to 
vacate the reduction order.  In granting the Government's motion 
to vacate, the court concluded that the passage of almost two and 
one half years between the filing of Diggs' motion and the 
court's order granting the reduction rendered the action 
inappropriate.  Although Diggs did not appeal the order, he filed 
a petition for habeas corpus questioning the court's vacatur of 
its prior order.  The district court dismissed the petition and 
Diggs appealed. 
  After finding that Diggs' claims were properly 
before the district court in a petition for habeas corpus, we 
held that two and one half years is not a reasonable time within 
which to decide a motion under Rule 35(b), no matter what the 
reason for the delay.  In so holding, we focused primarily on the 
dispersement of power between the judicial and executive branches 
with regard to determining the length and circumstances of an 
individual criminal's punishment.  We explained that: 
 the 120-day time limit serves chiefly to 
ensure that the power to reconsider 
sentencing decisions sensibly conferred on 
the district court by Congress and the 
Supreme Court via rule 35(b) does not become 
a tool for overruling the Parole Commission 
after that body, in consonance with the 
Parole Commission and Reorganization Act, 
  
determines the likely release date of the 
criminal.4 
Id. at 246.  Moreover, we noted that the district court in Diggs 
had been in a position to second-guess the Parole Commission and 
had in fact done so when it initially granted Diggs' motion for a 
reduction of sentence.  We concluded that a reasonable time does 
not give courts "a license to wait and reevaluate the sentencing 
decision in the light of subsequent developments."  Id. at 247.  
Thus, we held that Rule 35(b) does not countenance a two and one 
half year delay and found that the district court's vacatur of 
its prior order granting Diggs' Rule 35(b) motion gave proper 
regard to the "separation of powers" concerns underlying the 120-
day time limit on Rule 35(b) motions.   
  The present case is analogous to Diggs in that the 
twenty-five month delay between the filing of Idone's motion for 
reduction of sentence and the district court's original grant of 
that motion is not a reasonable time under Rule 35(b).  Id. at 
245-47; see also Taylor, 768 F.2d at 118 ("[W]e do question 
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  Although at the time of the Diggs decision Rule 35(b) did 
not explicitly provide a reasonable time beyond 120-days for a 
district court to decide a motion for reduction of sentence, we 
followed our precedent on this issue, which held that district 
courts retained jurisdiction over motions for a reduction of 
sentence for a "reasonable time" after the 120-day period 
specified by Rule 35(b).  Diggs, 740 F.2d at 245-46 (citing 
United States v. Janiec, 505 F.2d 983, 984-85 n.3 (3d Cir. 1974), 
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 948 (1975)).  Rule 35(b) was subsequently 
amended in 1985 to clarify that district courts are permitted to 
take a reasonable time to decide motions for reduction of 
sentence. 
  
whether an 18-month delay . . . could be considered reasonable 
under any set of circumstances that we have been able to 
imagine."); United States v. Smith, 650 F.2d 206, 209 (9th Cir. 
1981) (delays in ruling on motions for reduction of sentence 
ranging from 12 months to 42 months were not reasonable).  As 
explained in Diggs, the reasonable time limitation was intended 
to prevent courts from usurping the role of the Parole Board by 
sitting back and waiting to see what action the Parole Board 
would take before ruling on motions for reduction of sentence.  
However, that is exactly what the district court originally 
attempted to do in this case.  At the March 10, 1994, hearing, 
the district judge declared that he waited a significant amount 
of time before granting the motions for reduction of sentence for 
Idone's co-defendants "because I wanted to see to it that they 
put in the length of time that I intended when I entered the 
sentences.  Because at the time I didn't know what the Parole 
Board -- what release date would be set by the Parole Board.  And 
I had always anticipated doing something on their behalf, and I 
sat and waited on those for a long time, too.  And in this one 
[Idone's motion], I intended to do a similar act even on that 
basis . . .."  App. 371.  This wait and see approach is precisely 
the type of conduct that we condemned in Diggs.  Diggs, 740 F.2d 
at 246-47 ("The 'reasonable time' contemplated by Janiec and 
Gereau is a reasonable time to decide the issue presented by the 
  
rule 35 motion, not a license to wait and reevaluate the 
sentencing decision in the light of subsequent developments.").   
  Idone argues that the district court could not 
have usurped the power of the Parole Board in this case because 
the Board never took action with respect to Idone.  This argument 
is without merit.  As the Sixth Circuit in Taylor recognized, "it 
is not necessary that a district judge deliberately override a 
decision of the Parole Commission to impermissibly usurp the 
Commission's role."  Taylor, 768 F.2d at 118.  In Taylor, the 
district court delayed acting on Taylor's motion for a reduction 
of sentence in order to consider developments that had occurred 
subsequent to sentencing, including Taylor's behavior in prison.  
In holding that the district court abused its discretion in 
granting Taylor's motion eighteen months after it was filed, the 
Sixth Circuit found that a district court does not retain 
jurisdiction over a Rule 35(b) motion where the delay is "allowed 
by the court for a purpose in contravention of the rule."  Id. at 
118.  As in Taylor, the action by the district court in this case 
of waiting to see what the Parole Board would do is in 
contravention of Rule 35(b), even if the court eventually decided 
the motion before the Board took any action. 
  Idone also argues that the 1985 amendment to Rule 
35(b) deleted the jurisdictional requirement of the rule as long 
as a motion for reduction is filed within the 120-day period.  
Idone, however, misses the point of the 1985 amendment.  That 
  
amendment was adopted to resolve a split in the circuits over 
whether a court could retain jurisdiction over a Rule 35(b) 
motion beyond 120 days:  the majority of circuits (including the 
Third Circuit) had held that a court's jurisdiction extended for 
a reasonable time beyond 120 days, see, e.g., United States v. 
DeMier, 671 F.2d 1200 (8th Cir. 1982); whereas the Seventh 
Circuit held that the district court's jurisdiction ended after 
the 120th day, see United States v. Kajevic, 711 F.2d 767 (7th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1055 (1984).  The 1985 
amendment adopted the position of the majority of circuits, 
specifying that district courts "shall determine the motion 
within a reasonable time."  That position clearly holds that the 
failure of a district court to act on motions for reduction of 
sentence within a reasonable time is jurisdictional.5  Thus, this 
Court's jurisdictional treatment of the reasonable time 
limitation was embraced by the 1985 amendment, rather than 
deleted. 
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  Although the Diggs decision did not explicitly state that 
district courts lose their jurisdiction over Rule 35(b) motions 
after the passage of a reasonable time, it certainly implies as 
much.  See also Smith, 650 F.2d at 209 ("To the extent that the 
delays were 'unreasonable,' therefore, the district court was 
deprived of jurisdiction to consider them."); United States v. 
Mendoza, 581 F.2d 89, 90 (5th Cir. 1978) (district court retains 
jurisdiction for reasonable time after expiration of 120 days); 
Stollings, 516 F.2d at 1288 ("We hold that jurisdiction is not 
lost . . . at least for so long as the judge reasonably needs 
time to consider and act upon the motion.").  It is significant 
to note that the Smith and Stollings decisions were cited in the 
Advisory Committee's notes with respect to the 1985 amendment 
with approval.   
  
  In further support of his position, Idone cites 
United States v. House, 808 F.2d 508, 509 (7th Cir. 1986), in 
which the Seventh Circuit maintained that Rule 35(b), after the 
1985 amendment, "does not state a jurisdictional limit for the 
court's decision."  That statement, however, is dictum because 
the government in House did not even assert that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction over House's motion for a reduction of 
sentence.  Id. at 509 (recognizing that "[i]f the government is 
not concerned about the time the district court takes [to act on 
a motion for a reduction of sentence], an appellate court should 
not be concerned either").  Accordingly, Idone's argument that 
the 1985 amendment to Rule 35(b) deleted the jurisdictional 
requirement of the rule is without merit.  
  
  Accordingly, we hold that if a district court 
fails to decide a motion for a reduction of sentence under Rule 
35(b) within a reasonable time, the court loses jurisdiction.  
Because twenty-five months is not a reasonable time, the district 
court properly held that it was without jurisdiction to rule on 
Idone's motion for a reduction of sentence.   
 IV. 
  For the reasons stated above, the district court 
was correct in holding that it was without jurisdiction to decide 
Idone's motion for a reduction of sentence because the twenty-
five month period which elapsed between the filing of the motion 
and the court's decision was not a "reasonable time" under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b).  The judgment of the 
district court will be affirmed. 
 
 
 
